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PROTEST GROUPS AND LABOR DISPUTES-TOWARD A
DEFINITION OF "LABOR ORGANIZATION": CENTER FOR
UNITED LABOR ACTION
Expansion of the protest movement of the sixties into labor relations
has spawned a new problem in the interpretation of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)I: Whether protest groups such as the Center
for United Labor Action (CULA) 2 are labor organizations " within the
meaning of the Act. Such a determination is fundamental in that under
the NLRA only labor organizations 4 may be guilty of the unfair labor
practice of secondary consumer boycotts,5 or picketing to effect a total
boycott of a neutral employer.
In Center for United Labor Action (CULA),6 CULA, supporting the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America's (ACWA) drive to or-
ganize the employees of Farah Manufacturing Company (Farah), under-
took a secondary boycott of Sibley's Department Store to persuade
Sibley's to cease selling Farah products.7 Holding that CULA was not a
labor organization under the NLRA, the National Labor Relations
Board (Board) dismissed Sibley's complaint against the organization.'
In so concluding, the Board adopted the administrative law judge's
1. The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as
amended by the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Star. 136
(1947), constitutes the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
2. CULA is a group "devoted to the advancement of all workers of all races and
nationalities in the struggle against U.S. Corporations," Administrative Law Judge's
Decision Case 3-CC-808, slip opinion at 5, and "resembles many of the anti-war and
civil rights protest groups which emerged during the past decade." Brief for Respon-
dent at 3, Center for United Labor Action, 219 N.L.R.B. No. 158, 90 L.R.R.M. 1004
(July 30, 1975).
3. This issue is not unique to the recent protest movement. See Porto Mills, Inc.,
149 N.L.R.B. 1454, 57 L.R.R.M. 1504 (1964); Local Union 8505, District 30, UMW,
146 N.L.R.B. 652, 55 L.R.R.M. 1368 (1964).
4. Although prior to the Taft-Hartley amendments only an employer was subject
to the prohibitions of the NLRA, the amendments precluded unfair labor practices
by labor organizations as well, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970), thus making the NLRA
potentially more relevant to protest groups.
5. See notes 11-19 infra & accompanying text.
6. 219 N.L.R.B. No. 158, 90 L.R.R.M. 1004 (July 30, 1975).
7. For the details of the Farah dispute see Center for United Labor Action, 219
N.L.R.B. No. 158, 90 L.R.R.M. 1004 (July 30, 1975), Administrative Law Judge's
Decision, Case 3-CC-808, slip opinion at 3, and Brief for the Respondent at 4-5,
Center for United Labor Action, supra.




decision and approved, in dicta, -the judge's proposed standard: that to
qualify as a labor organization the group must be selected by employees
for the purpose of resolving their conflicts with employers.' The Board,
however, rejected the judge's subsidiary finding that CULA, by dealing
indirectly with the employer, met the literal definition of "labor organi-
zation," 10 and limited application of the term to groups dealing directly
with employers." '1  - -
To clarify the statutory meaning of the term "labor organization" and
thus ascertain its applicability to protest labor groups, the tests formulated
by'the judge and Board in CULA will be examined in* relation to per-
tinent legislative history, case law, and national labor policy.
SECONDARY BoYcoTTs: THE PROHIBITED AcTIVITY
UNDERTAKEN BY CULA
A consideration of the NLRA's prohibition of secondary boycotts is
integral to understanding the dispute in CULA. Under section 8 (b) (4)
(ii) (B) of the Act 12 it is an unfair labor practice to threaten, coerce, or
restrain any person with the object of forcing him to cease selling an-
other's product. CULA's picketing of Sibley's, urging a total boycott
of the store,1& clearly constituted coercion of a secondary employer, for
Sibley's, though not involved in the ACWA's dispute, was being forced
either to cease dealing with Farah or suffer a loss of patronage.14
9. Id.
10. For the statutory definition of "labor organization" see note 25 infra & ac-
companying text.
11. Center for United Labor Action 219 N.L.R.B. No. 158, 90 L.R.R.M. 1004 (July
30, 1975).
12. Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents . . . to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in com-
merce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an
object thereof is . . . forcing or requiring any person to cease using,
selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of
any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business
with any other person . .."
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (ii) (B) (1970).
13. The boycott and picketing were not limited to Farah products but rather, as
the placards indicated, applied to the entire store. Brief for Charging Party at 4.
14. In Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369
(1969), the Court stated: "The gravamen of a secondary boycott .. . is that its
sanctions bear, not upon the employer who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon
some third party who has no concern in it. Its aim is to compel him to stop business
with the employer in the hope that this will induce the employer to give in to his
employees' demands." Id. at 388, quoting International Bhd. of Electrical Workers
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A proviso to section 8 (b) (4),11 however, does allow limited secondary
activity by permitting publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose
of informing the public "that a product ... [is] produced by an em-
ployer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and [is]
distributed by another employer ... ." 16 In NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable
Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits)17 the Supreme
Court construed this proviso expansively by holding that a labor organi-
zation could conduct picketing on the premises of a secondary employer
so long as a boycott of the primary employer's product and not a boy-
cott of the store itself was advocated.' As evinced by Tree Fruits,
therefore, a boycott of Farah products by CULA clearly would have
been allowable regardless of CULA's status as a labor organization. 9
CULA, however, by boycotting the entire store with the object of
forcing Sibley's to either cease trading with Farah or lose business and
Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1950). Further evidence that CULA's
activity fell within the prohibition of the Act is found in Local 140, United Furniture
Workers v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 495, 502-03 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968),
and in Hoffman v. International Typographical Local 37, 243 F. Supp. 790, 791-92 (D.
Hawaii 1965).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1970). This proviso was added by the Landrum-Griffin
Act § 704, 73 Star. 541 (1959). For an interesting discussion of some of the negative
features of these amendments see Petro, Labor Relations Law, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 733,
757-61 (1960) in which the author asserts: "[a] measure of the inadequacy of Landrum-
Griffin is that it approves by implication all such perversions of the basic policy of
the Taft-Hartley Act, which was to confine work stoppages and labor disputes to the
parties immediately involved." Id. at 759.
In Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act,
44 MINN. L. REv. 257 (1959), the author discusses thoroughly the major modifications
achieved by the amendments.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970).
17. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
18. Id. at 71. The slogans on the picket signs specified that the boycott was against
a particular product (apples packed by nonunion firms employing strike breakers)
and not against the store.
The Tree Fruits decision is significant in that the Court, acknowledging that picket-
ing to persuade customers not to buy products of the primary employer was imper-
missible under the literal language of the statute, nonetheless allowed it, reasoning
that Congress' intent was not to prohibit such conduct. Id. at 70-71. For an analysis of
the Tree Fruits doctrine see 3 JENKINs, LABOR LAW §§ 16.9-16.12 (1974) and Lewis,
Consumer Picketing and the Court-The Questionable Yield of Tree Fruits, 49 MINN.
L. REv. 479 (1965). in which the author suggests that the Court, in reaching the
result in Tree Fruits, "strained the arguably 'plain meaning' of the section coupled
with its proviso, and overcame a legislative history which seemingly compelled a
contrary conclusion [that all consumer picketing was forbidden]." Id. at 481.
19. This is the type of boycotting engaged in by the ACWA. Brief for the Charg-
ing Party at 3.
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customers,20 aided the ACWA by doing what the ACWA, a labor or-
ganization, could not do.
Tim REQuSIrrE ELEMENTS OF A LABOR ORGANIZATION
Although not a conventional labor union,21 CULA possesses many of
the characteristics of a union22 in that it participates extensively in
picketing and leafleting.23 In CULA, however, the organization was
neither formally selected by the employees of Farah to represent them
nor did it collectively bargain for them.2 In this respect it differed from
the traditional union.
As defined in section 2 (5) of the NLRA,25 the term "labor organiza-
tion" means "any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee
representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with em-
ployers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, or conditions of work." 26 The breadth of this
description implies that even an unstructured protest group, although not
a conventional labor union, may fall within the purview of the Act.
Examination of the critical elements of the terms "organization," "em-
ployee participation," and "dealing" establishes the applicability of the
Act to groups such as CULA
CULA, as is characteristic of activist protest groups, is loosely struc-
tured.28 There are no officers; rather, it is run by a self-appointed chair-
20. CULA's news release stated its purpose was to stop Farah's strike breaking
policy. Id.
21. One of CULA's leaflets stated: "We should explain that [CULA] is not a union,
and [that we] could not ourselves conduct an organizing drive." Center for United
Labor Action, 219 N.L.R.B. No. 158, 90 L.R.R.M. 1004 (July 30, 1975), Administrative
Law Judge's Decision, Case 3-CC-808, slip opinion at 6. CULA's basic purpose was
to aid the unorganized in forming a union, id. at 5, in order to improve workers' wages
and working conditions. Their motto is: "If you haven't got a union-Fight to get
one! If you have one-Fight to make it fight!" Id.
22. Id. at 9.
23. CULA's activities are described in detail by the Administrative Law Judge. Id.
at 3-7.
24. Id. at 4, 6.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970).
26. Id.
27. A fourth element in the definition of "dealing" is "subject matter," which in-
volves ascertaining whether the dealing concerns, as the statute requires, grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work. As
this element was not at issue in CULA or in any of the cases discussed herein,'it is
without the scope of this Comment.
28. For a description of CULA's structure see Center for United Labor Action,
1976]
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person or _teering committee. Even though the group maintains a list
of those making donations, it has no members in the ordinary sense. No
dues are collected; no evidence of membership is issued. Under a narrow
interpretation of section 2 (5), a group as unstructured as CULA might
fail to meet the "organization" element.29 Case law3° and the legislative
history-" of the section, however, rather than substantiating such a
narrow interpretation, have mandated that no formal structure is re-
quired.3 2 A "loosely-formed committee" will suffice.3s The group need
219 N.L.R.B. No. 158, 90 L.R.R.M. 1004 (July 30, 1975), Administrative Law Judge's
Decision, Case 3-CC-808, slip opinion at 3-4.
29. Notably, under 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1970) and 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970), a labor
organization can be sued as an entity for damages collectible only from the organiza-
tion and not from its members. This may indicate that the organization must have at
least enough structure and sufficient continuous membership to determine who can
speak for the group as an entity, who should be served with process, and who is re-
sponsible for the group's funds.
30. See notes 32-38, 77-82 infra & accompanying text.
31. S. Rr'. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935). See also Indiana Metal Prods.
Corp. v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1953). There the court stated: "The legislative
history shows that the definition of the term 'labor organization' was purposefully
phrased very broadly." Id. at 621 (footnote omitted).
32. As stated in NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1971), "[t]he statute has
been broadly construed, both with respect to absence of formal organization and
the type of interchange between the parties which may be deemed 'dealing'." Id. at 84
(footnotes omitted). In Ampex, the committee held to be a labor group consisted of
employees chosen at random on a rotating basis and thus lacked continuous member-
ship. The corporation compared the group to a personal suggestion box. Id.
33. See e.g., Western Addition Commun. Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir.
1973), rev'd on other grounds sub norm., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition
Commun. Org., 95 S. Ct. 977 (1975) (dissident laborgroup deemed a labor organiza-
tion despite its loose structure because it sought direct bargaining with the employer);
NLRB v. Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 458 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1972) (group deemed a labor
organization despite its amorphous structure because its purpose and function was to
deal with management); Indiana Metal Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 613, 621 (7th
Cir. 1953) (absence of formal organization does not invalidate labor organization
status); NLRB v. American Furnace Co., 158 F.2d 376, 378 (7th Cir. 1946) (labor
organization existed despite lack of formal organization, continuity from one com-
mittee to another, constitution, or by-laws).
For articles dealing with the labor organization status of such loosely structured
groups as civil rights organizations and faculty senates see: Gould, Black Power in
the Unions: The Impact Upon Collective Bargaining Relationships, 79 YALE L.J. 46,
73-77 (1969) (committees of black worker and civil rights groups which intervene on
behalf of minority group employees); Herman, Private Arrangements and Agreements
for Employment of Minority Groups, N.Y.U. 24TH CONF. ON LABOR 279, 304-05 (1971)
(civil rights organizations involved in employment disputes qualify as labor organiza-
tions); Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Policyntaking
Through Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A.L. RRv. 63, 147-51 (1973) (faculty senate is a labor
organization under the inclusive statutory definition); Meltzer, The NLRA and
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not have officers, a charter, by-laws, or a constitfidon.34 Nor, are mem-
bership requirements, dues, or funds necessaryYI
In light of the consistently liberal interpretations-" of "organization,"
it appears that a group, even less structured than CULA would come
within the ambit of this term under section 2(5). In NLRB v. Ken-
nametal, IZc.,37 for instance, a group Of workers who suddenly decided
to visit the president's office and demand higher wages was held to be
a labor organization. The implication of this decision is that any pro-
test group, no matter how loosely formed, will-be deemed an organiza-
tion under the Act. Illustrative of such groups are two individuals who,
upon seeing one another in front of a store, agree to take shifts and
picket, or interested citizens who decide spontaneously to join and
picket a store because of their support for workers whose employer
Racial Discrimination, 42 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 1, 35 (1974)' (loosely structured dissident
racial minority group a labor organization).
34. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sterling Elec. Motors, Inc., 109 F.2d 194, (9th Cir. 1940);
Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 186, N.L.R.B. ,324, 333, 75 L.R.R.M. 1349 (1970); Yale Univ., 184
N.L.R.B. 746, 75 L.R.R.M. 1190 (1970); Coppus Eng'r. Corp., 115 N.L.R.B. 1381, 1391,
38 L.R.R.M. 1079 (1956).
35. See, e.g., NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 209 (1959); Utrad Corp.,
185 N.L.R.B. 434, 440, 75 L.R.R.M. 1069 (1970).
36. This statement must be qualified in that none of the cases construing the term
"organization" were concerned with a suit against the organization for an unfair labor
practice; rather, they all concerned unfair labor practices by the employer. Notably,
though, Indiana Metal Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 613, 621 (7th Cir. 1953), in-
volved a charge that an employee had been wrongfully discharged due to participation
in ,a labor organization. The other cases involved charges that the company had
dominated the labor organization. See notes 32-35 supra. Thus, none concerned the
problems of suing a labor organization. See note 29 supra. Consequently, it is con-
ceivable that a court might find a group to be an organization under the NLRA if
an unfair labor practice by the company is involved, but not such an organization
if an unfair labor practice by the group is involved.
37. 182 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1950).
38. The facts in Kennarnetal illustrate how informal the organization of a labor
group might be. Several employees were discussing wages at work when' one suggested
they present their grievances to the company president. As they walked to his office
their members increased to approximately one hundred. The court stated: "It seems
perfectly clear to us that the employees who informally joined together to present
their grievances . .. fall well -within the statutory definition [of labor organization]:'
Id. at 818.
Similarly, in National Packing Co. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 800 (10th Cit. 1967), the
court held that a group of employees who spontaneously picketed their employer to
protest unsafe working conditions constituted a labor union, for although the em-
ployees "did not have the' organic structure of a typical labor union, they were a group
which acted in unison to obtain mutual objectives by combined efforts." Id. at 803.
See also Gullett Gin Co. v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1950); Smith*Victory Corp.,
90 N.L.R.B. 2089, 26 L.R.R.M. 1420 (1950).
19761,
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
sells products through the store, or finally, several dissenting CULA
members who agree to picket, contrary to their group's decision. Such
ad hoc protest groups are less structured than CULA in that they are
not "highly purposed with a continuous existence." 39 Yet under the
standards of Kenmzmetal they surely would be deemed organizations.
Indeed, under the Kennametal interpretation of section 2(5), perhaps
only a single picket would be outside the ambit of the "organization"
element.
As illustrated, "the degree of organization necessary to qualify as a
labor [union] is absolutely minimal." 40 Similarly, the requirement that
employees participate in the labor group is construed expansively. Al-
though in CULA both parties stipulated that this element was met,41 the
broader question of the applicability of the Act to protest groups in
general merits discussion of the "employee participation" factor. Sec-
tion 2(3) of the NLRA states that the term "employee" includes any
employee and is not restricted to those of a particular employer.4 2 Con-
gress, in drafting such an inclusive definition, acknowledged that "dis-
putes may arise regardless of whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee .. ." .4 The Supreme
Court further expanded the meaning of "employee" by holding that it
included workers who, after being discharged, had obtained employment
elsewhere.4 4 As asserted in Marine Engineers Beneficial Association v.
Interlake Steamship Co.,45 interpreting the "employee participation" ele-
ment, whenever a reasonably arguable case is made, the courts should
invest a union with labor organization status.46 In view of the liberal
39. Center for United Labor Action, 219 N.L.R.B. No. 158, 90 L.R.R.M. 1004 (July
30, 1975), Administrative Law Judge's Decision, Case 3-CC-808, slip opinion at 9.
40. Herman, Private Arrangements and Agreements for Employment of Minority
Groups, N.Y.U. 24TH CONF. ON LABOR 279, 304-05 (1971).
41. 219 N.L.R.B. No. 158, 90 L.R.R.M. 1004 (July 30, 1975), Administrative Law
Judge's Decision, Case 3-CC 808, slip opinion at 8.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
43. H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr, (1935), at 3056 [hereinafter cited as 2
HISTORY OF THE N.L.R.A.], quoted in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 192
(1941).
44. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 189-197 (1941).
45. 370 U.S. 173 (1962).
46. Id. at 182. This is significant in that, unlike the cases which support applying
the "organization" element to CULA, see notes 31-34 supra, Marine Engineers involved
secondary picketing and an unfair labor practice charge against the organization. 370
U.S. at 183. The Court held that even though the organization consisted partially of
supervisors, it could be considered an organization in which employees participate, id.
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construction of the term "employee," it appears that a protest group
composed only of unemployed persons who have not worked recently
would fail to satisfy the "employee participation" element. Such an ex-
pansive interpretation may be of dubious validity whenever one's status
as an employee is unrelated to the dispute.47 To be distinguished, how-
ever, is the situation in which the employee previously worked for the
company involved in the dispute or for one doing business with that
company.
The "dealing" element, pivotal to CULA, is the most complex com-
ponent of the term "labor organization," 48 as evidenced by the various
interpretations of that element articulated by the judge and Board. The
judge, for example, stated in dicta that indirect dealing with an employer
(dealing by means other than direct requests or face-to-face negotiations)
fulfilled the literal definition of "dealing," but that this interpretation
frustrated the spirit of the NLRA when applied to CULA." He there-
at 183-84, despite the definition in section 2(11) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11)
(1970), clearly distinguishing supervisors from employees.
For other cases refusing to narrow the scope of the definition despite the member-
ship of supervisors or other exempt workers see NLRB v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co.,
169 F.2d 571, 576 (6th Cir. 1948); Ravenna Arsenal, Inc, 98 N.L.R.B. 1, 29 L.R.R.M.
1283 (1952); American Bdcstg. Co, 96 N.L.R.B. 1410, 27 L.R.R.M. 1585 (1951);
Teamsters, Local 87, 87 N.L.R.B. 720, 721, 25 L.R.R.M. 1223 (1949).
47. For example, although it appears reasonable to classify as an employee a person
who has recently been discharged by the company with which there is a dispute, there
is no reason so to classify one who never has had any dealings with the company
involved despite his employee status with another firm.
48. 29 U.S.C. 152(5) (1970). Notably, in determining whether an organization. exists
"for the purpose in whole or in part of dealing with employers," 29 U.S.C. § 152(5)
(1970), case law has focused on both the declared purpose of the group as well as its
actual dealings. The Court in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co, 360 U.S. 203 (1959), noting
that courts consistently had held that employee committees which functioned similarly
to those in this case were labor organizations, id. at 212, expressly considered not only
the declared purpose but also the actual function of the group. Id. at 213. Similarly,
in Indiana Metal Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1953), the court
emphasized not only the purpose for which the committee was established but also
the fact that "in practice the committee [had] functioned as a vehicle for the dis-
cussion... of working conditions." Id. at 621.
49. 219 N.L.R.B. No. 158, 90 L.R.R.M. 1004 (July 30, 1975), Administrative Law
Judge's Decision, Case 3-CC-808, slip opinion at 8-10.
50. Id. at 10-11. The judge did not articulate clearly why the dealing engaged in by
CULA affronted the spirit of the NLRA. He apparently believed that the goal of the
Act, to maintain industrial peace, was fulfilled by allowing employees to select repre-
sentatives and resolve disputes with management. Positing that a group falling without
this definition was not covered by the NLRA, the judge then implied that the required
"resolving" element demanded more than such indirect dealing as picketing and leaf-
letting. id. It is submitted that the validity of this reasoning is questionable. See notes
74-89 infra & accompanying text.
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fore refused to vest the group with labor organization status. The Board,
however, eschewed the contention that indirect dealing manifested even
the letter of the law, and held that the Act concerned only direct deal-
ing consisting of face-to-fa'e negotiations.5' Finally, under the standard
adopted by the judge as dispositive and by the Board in dicta,52 to adhere
to the spirit of the NLRA not only must the organization deal directly
with the employer, but further, it must have been selected by the em-
ployees for the purpose of resolving their conflicts with employers. 3
The Direct and Indirect Dealing Tests: Which Is Warranted by the
Act?
In considering whether the letter of the law requires direct dealing
only, it first should be noted that the cases construing the "dealing'
element dictate a liberal interpretation.,4 In NLRB v. Cabot Carbon
Co., 55 the leading case interpreting the phrase, the Supreme Court stated
that the term is more inclusive than "bargaining," " thus corroborating
the view that indirect dealing satisfies the letter of the law since bar-
gaining requires direct negotiation. The labor organization in Cabot
Carbon, however, in meeting with company officials to discuss wages,
hours, and conditions of employment, did deal directly. 7 Notably
though, because the organization did not deal at arms length, but rather,
simply made recommendations subject to final disposition by the manage-
ment, 18 it did not engage in collective bargaining. 9 In NLRB v. Ampex
51. 219 N.L.R.B. No. 158, 90 L.R.R.M. 1004 (1975).
52. Id.
53. Id., Administrative Law Judge's Decision, Case 3-CC-808, slip opinion at 10-11.
54. See notes 55-69 infra & accompanying text.
55. 360 U.S. 203 (1958). Accord, Jansen Electronics Mfg., Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 1555,
1558, 59 L.R.R.M. 1750 (1965).
56. 360 U.S. at 210-14. The Court based its interpretation in part on the plain words
of the statute, concluding that "[clertainly nothing in [the] section indicates that the
broad term 'dealing with' is to be read as synonymous with the more limited term
'bargaining with.'" Id. at 211. Also considered significant was that the then Secretary
of Labor's proposal to substitute the term "bargaining collectively" for "dealing" was
not adopted. Id. See Indiana Metal Prods. Corp. V. NLRB, 202 F.2d 613, 620-21 (7th
Cir. 1953) (advisory committee formed as substitute for bona fide bargaining repre-
sentative held to be labor organization).
57. 360 U.S. at 213.
58. Id. at 214. But see Petro, Labor Re'ations Law, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 733 (1960), in
which the author propounds that the Court in Cabot Carbon made a "specious and
wooden interpretation of the statute" when it found that a group which did "nothing re-
motely resembling collective bargaining" was a labor organization. Id. at 765-66. Criticiz-
ing what he views as the Court's highly questionable interpretation of the expression, id.
at 766, the author concludes that simple discussion of grievances does not constitute
[Vol. 17:796
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Corp.6° the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concurred in the
Cabot, Carbon determination as to the extent of dealing required for a
labor organization., Yet4, by noting that ,the committee suggestions
therein examined, often- resulted in action by management,62 the court
implied that someaction must be taken upon such requests to satisfy
the dealing requirement. Apparently, however, the more reasonable
interpretation of Cabot. Carbon is that- mere communication of pro-
posals constitutes dealing; G3 the management may act upon such sug-
gestions, but it need not do so.6" In further support of this more inclusive
view, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in NLRB v.
Thompson Ramo-Wooldridge, 47. 65 that even "express recommenda-
tions [are] not essential to 'dealing,' if discussion . . was designed to
remedy grievances." 66
dealing; rather, something more '(formal and binding, along the lines of a collective
agreement," is necessary. ld. 1n Cabot Carbon, he maintains, the committee did not
deal but merely "advised with." The author concurs, therefore, with the opinion of
the Fifth Circuit in Cabot-Carbon Co; v. NLRB, 256 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1958), rejected
by the Supreme Court, tlar, as the proscriptions against unfair practices were meant
to preclude employers from co ercing employees' decisions regarding unionization and
as no coercion was present, Section 9(a), explicitly authorizing employees to present
grievances to their employers and to have such grievances resolved, was the more
pertinent provision to apply. Petro, Labor Relations, Law, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 733, 766-67
(1960).-
59. For a description of the bargaining procedure which does entail proposals and
counterl)roposals see H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-23 (1947), reprinted
in I LEGISL.TIvE HISTORY or THEr LABOR I14ANAGEMENT RElATios Acr 312,14 (1947)
[hereinafter cited as 1 HISTORY OF:THE L.M.R.A.].
60. 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1971).
61. ld.,at 84.
62. Id.
63. But see Holland Mfg. Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 776, 784, 47 L.R.R.M. 1067 (1960);
Whirlpool Corp.,, 126 NL.R.B. 1117, 1133, 45 L.R.R.M. 1445 (1960) (in both cases,
the Board concluded that because of specific action taken on numerous complaints the
committees were labor organizations that existed not merely to transmit information
but.also to settle grievances and to deal with management).
64. See, e.g., Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. 324, 333, 75 L.R.R.M. 1349 (1970).
(although specific action was taken to remedy some complaints, management made no
promises to act but simply to consider and look into matters); -itrad Corp., 185
N.L.R.B. 434, 441, 75 L.R.R.M. 1069 (1970) (despite the corporate president's state-
ment that he could not negotiate but would only consider proposals, labor organiza-
tion status was affirmed). Notably, in Utrad, even though the group functioned prin-
cipally as a social organization, it was considered a labor organization because it
existed in part for purposes of working with management concerning employee com-
plaints.
65. 305 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1962).
66. Id. at 810. See also NLRB v. Jas. H. Mathews & Co., 156 F.2d 706 (3d Cir. 1946).
In Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc. 132 N.L.R.B. 993, 48 L.R.R.M. 1470 (1961),
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Because the cases discussed above involved direct exchanges, the broad
construction of "dealing" established by them is not dispositive of
whether "dealing" may be indirect. An organization, for example, may
convey its demands to management by printing requests on signs carried
by pickets rather than by conveying them in oral confrontation. Does
such indirect communication constitute "dealing"? One Board decision,
Porto Mills, Inc.,67 answered this question affirmatively when it found
that striking and picketing by a militant anti-union group for the ouster
of a union employee constituted dealing with respect to the working
conditions of the company. 68 By adopting the direct dealing standard
in CULA, however, the Board overruled sub silentio its decision in
Porto Mills, Inc.6 9
ARE THE REQUIREMENTS THAT A GROUP BE SELECTED BY EMPLOYEES
FOR RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITH EMPLOYERS MERITED UNDER THE ACT?
As previously noted, the administrative law judge in CULA departed
from a literal interpretation of section 2 (5) and added two elements to
the statutory definition of "labor organization" when he stated that
such a group must be selected by employees with the basic objective
of resolving their disputes with employers.70 Apparently, the judge
enforced as modified, 305 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1962), even an agreement between the
organization and the employer that the association was not to act as a labor organiza-
tion was held not determinative.
67. 149 N.L.R.B. 1454, 57 L.R.R.M. 1504 (1964). This decision is relied upon heavily
by the dissent in CULA, 219 N.L.R.B. No. 158, 90 L.R.R.M. at 1006.
68. 149 N.L.R.B. at 1472. The principal activity of the committee was striking and
picketing. As noted by the Board, however, a group of anti-union employees had
also personally informed the manager of their stance. Id. at 1472 n.35. The committee
had contended it was not a labor organization because its sole purpose was to oppose
.unionism. Id. Although accepting this to be the committee's primary goal, and
recognizing the anomaly of holding that an anti-union group qualifies as a labor
union, id. at 1472, the Board complied with the congressional intent to extend coverage
beyond conventional labor organizations to include those which might effectively
thwart employee self-organization and selection of collective bargaining representa-
tives, and concluded that the committee was a labor organization. Id.
69. Anoiher case, Local 8505, UMW, 146 N.L.R.B. 652, 55 L.R.R.M. 1368 (1964),
which may be interpreted as involving indirect dealing with employers by means of
pickets, reached the opposite result from Porto Mills, Inc. The decision, however, is
not determinative of the need for direct dealing in that it was predicated not on the
absence of direct communication with the employer, but rather on the lack of any
dealing at all with management.
70. 219 N.L.R.B. No. 158, 90 L.R.R.M. 1004, Administrative Law Judge's Decision,




derived his two-step test from section 1 of the NLRA,71 which states
that the means for achieving the Act's overriding policy of eliminating
obstructions to the free flow of commerce is "by protecting the exer-
cise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their ourn choosing, for the purpose
of negotiating the terms and conditions of employment or other mutual
aid or protection." 72 Notably, the policy statement quoted by the
judge mentions choosing groups not only for the purpose of negotiating,
but also for other "mutual aid or protection," implying that a group
which does not seek to resolve disputes but merely attempts to make
recommendations would fulfill the cited policy objectives as well. Be-
cause policy statements are not designed to serve as constructs for the
development of rigid tests, however, it is submitted that the two-step
test developed by the judge in CULA is both artificial and unduly
narrow.73 Moreover, assuming arguendo that the NLRA mandates such
71. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
72. 219 N.L.R.B. No. 158, 90 L.R.R.M. 1004, Administrative Law Judge's Decision,
Case 3-CC-808, slip opinion at 10 n.11, quoting 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970) (emphasis
supplied). The judge's focus on negotiation was based on a narrow conception of
the policy or spirit of the Act. Legislative history does offer some support for the
narrower view. For example, S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935), reprinted
in 2 HISTORY OF THE N.L.R.A., supra note 43, at 2301, asserts that 25 percent of all
strikes result from the failure to use collective bargaining and that the NLRA should
create the machinery to facilitate collective bargaining. This supports the emphasis
on negotiation. However, legislative history can also be evoked to challenge this
narrower view.
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 10-11 (1947), reprinted in 1 HisToRy OF
L.M.R.A., supra -note 59, at 301-02, explains that Congress intended section 2 to mean
that workers should be protected in exercising their rights to collectively bargain,
"but only when they wished to do so." Id. (emphasis supplied). Significantly, the
Report notes that the Board had mistakenly interpreted the language as commanding
employees to bargain collectively "even against their will." Id. at 302. In other words,
collective bargaining is admittedly an encouraged but not a compelled means of
achieving industrial peace. So long as an opportunity is provided whereby one may
freely choose representatives who may then, if desired, bargain collectively, the Act's
mandate is vindicated for "the underlying concept of the act [is] that an effective
guarantee to employees of the right to organize and to bargain collectively or to
refrain from such activity [will] allay industrial disruption . . . ." Ordman, The
National Labor Relations Act: Current Developments, N.Y.U. 24TH CoNp. ON LABOR
115, 117 (1971).
73. The judge's argument also fails to consider that the NLRA provides other
means for accomplishing its overriding aim of obviating industrial disruption: for
example, the proscription of secondary boycotts under the Taft-Hartley amendments.
As evinced by the legislative history, one of the primary goals of the Taft-Hartley
amendments was to end prevalent industrial disturbances, not as in the NLRA,
through the encouragement of collective bargaining, but rather, through the restriction
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a test, the impracticality of its application becomes clear once the
"selected by" and "resolved" elements are properly defined.
The "selected by" element should be deemed satisfied not only when
an organization has been selected by employees, but also when an or-
ganization seeks to represent or seeks to be selected by employees. A
contrary conclusion would emasculate section 8 (b) (7) 4 of the NLRA,
of secondary boycotts. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6 (1947), re-
printed in 1 HISTORY OF THE L.M.R.A., supra note 59, at 294-97, quoted in Brief for
Charging Party at 16. Picketing a neutral employer's place of business was outlawed
in the NLRA because, as the report noted, such businesses often had been incapaci-
tated and the flow of commerce thus impeded by disputes to which the employer was
not a party and in which he had no interest. Id. For both a detailed analysis of the
statute's history and an explication of the interrelation of section 8(b) (4) (B), which
proscribes secondary boycotts, with other sections see National Woodwork Mfrs.
Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967). See generally 3 JENKINS, LABOR LAW 423-507
(1974).
By precluding labor organizations from coercing a neutral employer to stop trading
with the primary employer, the amendments sought to inhibit industrial conflicts. As
a group must be a labor organization to be subject to the prohibitions of the NLRA,
the judge's more restrictive standard arguably is unjustified. A counterargument,
however, to concluding that the policy against secondary boycotts supports a more
expansive definition is that the examples of disruptive, undesirable secondary activity
cited by the proponents of the amendments are distinguishable from picketing by
protest groups, in that they involved traditional unions and generally dealt with boy-
cotts in which control over the employees, not over the employer, was sought. A
central theme recurrent throughout these provisions is the desire to promote industrial
well-being and especially to protect employers from union pressures aimed at in-
volving him in disputes not his own. The proponents of the amendments cited numer-
ous examples of such attempts to involve neutral employers: 93 CONG. REc. 3534
(1947) (remarks of Representative Hart), reprinted in I HISTORY OF THE L.M.R.A.,
supra note 59, at 613-14; 93 CONG. REc. 3359 (1947) (remarks of Representative Budi),
reprinted in 1 HISTORY OF L.M.R.A., supra note 59, at 658-59 (both citing attempts by
unidns to force employees to join by refusing to deliver or handle employers' goods);
93 CONG. REc. 3954 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft), reprinted in 2 HISTORY OF
L.M.R.A., supra note 43, at 1012 (citing as one type of action a union's refusal to handle
an employer's product because it was made by another union); 93 CONG. REC. 5147
(1947) (remarks of Senator Ball), reprinted in 2 HISTORY OF THE L.M.R.A., supra
note 43, at 1497 (primary objective of the majority of secondary boycotts is not the
employer but the employee over whom control is sought). Although picketing such
as CULA's, in front of a retail establishment, is exertion of economic pressure against
the business, it is different from the preceding examples in that the pickets are ad-
dressing their message to the public in general rather than to the employees or other
union affiliates. However, although the examples are different in that sense from
CULA's activity, the congressmen made it clear they were illustrating one type of
secondary activity.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (1970). The section provides that it shall be an unfair
labor practice to picket "[Wihere an object thereof is . . . forcing or requiring the
employees of an employer to accept or select such labor organization as their collective
bargaining representative . . . ." Id.
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which restricts organizational and recognitional picketing by an uncer-
tified labor union; for clearly a union picketing to organize or be recog-
nized by workers has not yet been selected by those workers.75
Moreover, a broad definition of the "selected by" element is consistent
with case law that has deemed as labor organizations groups which lack
a formal structure, a. constitution, officers, and dues or membership
requirements. 76 Thus, in the Cabot Carbon line of cases, 77 company-
dominated grievance committees were deemed labor organizations, indi-
cating the selection of a group need not be entirely the unrestricted
choice of employees. And in Porto Mills, lnc. 78 a committee formed
solely to oppose unionization was deemed a labor organization although
the group was not selected by the employees but rather, sought to repre-
sent the workers in expressing their grievances. 79 Significantly, in finding
that the committee was a labor organization, the trial examiner focused
upon the fact that the group acted in concert in striking and picketing
ratier than that it acted as the representative of the employees.6 0 Finally,
as noted earlier, in NLRB v. Kennametal, Inc. 1 an ad hoc group that
spontaneously decided to present grievances to an employer was
deemed a labor organization. 82
The apparent conclusion to be drawn from these cases and from
the language of section 8(b) (7) is that a group acting for the benefit
of employees and exhibiting some indicia of employee approval of its
activities will meet the "selected by" element. That element, then, re-
quires no more than the previously discussed broadly-defined requisite
that a labor organization be a group evidencing "employee participa-
tion." It therefore serves no purpose and is in fact potentially dangerous,
for if utilized, it may be construed too narrowly, the result of which
would be to deny labor organization status to groups embodying both
the letter and spirit of the NLRA. 3
75. Such an interpretation is suggested by Simmons, Inc. v. NLRB, 287 F.2d 628
(1st Cir. 1961), which stated: "If . . . it sought to have itself recognized or bargained
with, then it acted as a labor organization." Id. at 629.
76. See notes 33-40 supra & accompanying text.
77. See notes 55-56 supra & accompanying text.
78. 149 N.L.R.B. 1454, 1471, 57 L.R.R.M. 1504 (1964).
79. It sought to represent workers in that it sought to convey to management the
desire of the worker not to have a union. In a sense, it competed with the union for
the right to represent workers. Id. Arguably, because of the existence of officers, a
selection process occurred, but the Board did not discuss this point.
80. Id. at 1472.
81. 182 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1950).
82. See note 38 supra & accompanying text.
83. Although CULA may not have been selected by Farah employees in any
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The meaning of the "resolving" element is equally problematic. The
administrative law judge apparently concluded that existing for the
purpose of resolving does not mean existing for the purpose of petition-
ing and persuading, for although he asserted that CULA "exists clearly,
in part, to petition and persuade employers to specific conduct in labor
disputes," 84 he determined that CULA "did not exist for the purpose
of adjusting or resolving the disputes in which [it had] become in-
volved." s5 Clearly, as evinced in the Supreme Court's holding in Cabot
Cabon that a group need not collectively bargain to be a labor organi-
zation, the judge could not have intended that resolving means collective
bargaining."6
What then does resolving mean if it must entail something more than
"petitioning and persuading" but less than collective bargaining or
negotiating? If a group in dealing with employers advances beyond
petitioning or persuading it appears that it then must entertain proposals
and submit further counter-proposals: in short, negotiate or bargain.8 7
As no intermediate step apparently exists, the judge's "resolving" test is
rendered meaningless. As such, not only does the element add nothing
to the statutory language, "exists .. . for the purpose of dealing with
18 it also compels the conclusion that CULA's activities suffice.89
THE IMPLICATIONS OF CULA
As manifested in CULA, the crucial element in interpreting the term
"labor organization" is "dealing." Consistent with an expansive inter-
pretation of Cabot Carbon, the Board overruled sub silentio its earlier
sense, see note 24 supra & accompanying text, CULA's activities in general seem to
meet the proper selected by test; see note 23 supra & accompanying text; and in de-
termining whether a group is a labor organization, its activities in general control.
84. 219 N.L.R.B. No. 158, 90 L.R.R.M. 1004, Administrative Law Judge's Decision,
Case 3-CC-808, slip opinion at 9.
85. Id. at 11.
86. See note 55 sitpra & accompanying text.
87. For a description of the bargaining procedure which does entail proposals and
counter proposals see H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-23, reprinted in 1
HIsTORY OF THrE L.M.R.A., supra note 58, at 312-14.
88. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970).
89. In the dispute leading to the CULA litigation it is less than clear that CULA's
purpose was to deal with Farrah, but CULA's other activities indicate that given
this interpretation of the "resolving" element CULA did exist to deal with Farrah. See
note 23, supra & accompanying text. As previously noted, the administrative law




decision in Porto Mills by refusing to sanction an indirect dealing test.
By approving, in dicta, the judge's "selected by" and "resolving" tests,
however, the Board departed from a liberal construction of Cabot Car-
bon and cast doubt once again upon the continuing viability of Porto
Mills.
The decision in CULA, that the protest labor group involved therein
did not possess labor organization status, represents only a partial vic-
tory for CULA. Although the result permits groups such as CULA to
engage in secondary boycotts unhampered by the prohibitions of the
NLRA, it also may deny them the protections provided by certain
sections of the Act. For example, section 8(a) (1)90 makes it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to interfere with employees desiring to
form, join, and assist labor organizations. By implication, then, an em-
ployer could prevent his employees from participating in the activities
of a protest group not deemed to be a labor organization. Moreover,
section 8(a)(3)91 prohibits discrimination with respect to hiring or
tenure of employment as a means of discouraging membership in a
labor organization, implying such discrimination could be~employed to
discourage membership in a non-labor organization. Once it is estab-
lished that an organization does not fall within the ambit of the
NLRA, federal preemption is not invoked,92 and the group's activities,
rather than being subject to the Board's exclusive jurisdiction,93 may
fall under the state law of trespass and interference with prospec-
90. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1970).
91. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970).
92. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246 (1959) (espoused
principle that whenever subject matter of an action involved conduct arguably pro-
tected or prohibited under the NLRA, subject matter was generally immune to other
federal or state regulation). See a'so Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v. Interlake Steam-
ship Co., 370 U.S. 173, 184 (1962) (dicta) (underlying issue on which Board's juris-
diction depended was determination that group was a labor organization).
93. See Petro, Labor Relations Law, 35 N.Y.UL. REv. 733-47 (1960), for a pene-
trating criticism of Garnnon and of the preemption doctrine, the effect of which has
been a "series of catastrophic and destructive miscarriages of justice." Id. at 740. The
author declares that in reality the preemption doctrine and not the participation of
state courts in adjudicating unfair practice cases is thwarting national goals of alleviating
industrial discord. Id.
For cases that have made inroads in Garnon see for example: Motor Coach Em-
ployees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); International Bhd. of Boilermakers v.
Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233 (1971); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770,
398 U.S. 235 (1970). Furthermore, there are certain areas in which the states have
been permitted to exercise jurisdiction despite Garmion. See, e.g., Linn v. United Plant
Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966); Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2,
Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181 (1965).
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tive advantage with their corresponding remedies of damages and
injunction.
Significantly, CULA creates the possibility that unions may circum-
vent the prohibition against secondary boycotts and violate the principal
goal of allaying industrial strife by encouraging protest groups to use
such proscribed tactics. The judge in CULA acknowledged that this is
a serious and valid concern,95 for although a union that provokes or
instigates a wrong is a party to that wrong, 6 it may prove difficult to
establish the requisite agency relationship so as to impute liability.
9 7
Juxtaposed to the primary concern of promoting industrial harmony
is that of guaranteeing, under the first amendment, the freedom to
publicize peacefully a labor dispute.98 By restricting the definition of
94. The imposition of state sanctions will be subject to first amendment protections.
See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), in which picketing was proclaimed
to be a form of first amendment speech.
95. Administrative Law Judge's Decision, Case No. 3-CC-808, slip opinion at 11.
96. Selby-Battersby & Co. v. NLRB, 259 F.2d 151, 157 (4th Cir. 1958); IBEW,
Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1950).
97. For example, a worker who was a member of a union could, without the
knowledge or authorization of union leadership, organize a protest group to do what the
union could not, knowingly circumventing the law to further the union's goal. Yet,
unless an agency relationship could be established, the union could not be held responsible
for the protest group's acts. But see Sealright Pacific, Ltd., 82 N.L.R.B. 271, 23
L.R.R.M. 1572 (1949), in which the Board asserted that the question of the union's
responsibility is not necessarily dependent upon whether specific acts performed were
actually authorized, but rather that the authority will be implied whenever the conduct
of the principal manifests an intent to confer such authority.
98. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), in which the Court held uncon-
stitutional an Alabama statute forbidding picketing for the purpose of injuring a
lawful business. Picketing was held to be a useful means whereby those directly
involved could inform the public of the nature and causes of a labor dispute. Id. at
104. In a companion case, Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940), the Court de-
clared that peaceful publicity of the facts of a labor dispute through appropriate
means, such as pamphlets, word of mouth or placards. "must now be regarded as
within that liberty of communication which is secured to every person by the Four-
teenth Amendment against abridgment by a state." Id. at 113.
For a brief discussion of the Court's subsequent retreat from the pronouncement
in Thornhill that picketing was a form of first amendment speech and of the recent
revival of the first amendment protection provided picketing see Gould, Black Power
in the Unions: The Impact Upon Collective Bargaining Relationships, 79 YALE L.J. 46.
79 (1969). As discussed in 3 JENKi,%s, LABOR LAW 271-72, 333-36 (1974), the free
speech defense is inapplicable to violations involving picketing of secondary employers.
In Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REv. 574 (1951), the
author argues that the crucial inquiry in determining if first amendment immunity for
picketing may be invoked is whether the employees' message is directed to the general
public, primarily to express their views and to obtain publicity, or whether it is ad-
dressed to other employees, dependent not on persuasiveness, but on the severity of
economic threats for its effectiveness.
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labor organization so that more groups are outside the purview of the
NLRA, and their picketing thus not subject to federal remedies, the
Board has implicitly decided this conflict in favor of freedom of expres-
sion. In so doing, the Board has reaffirmed the principle of Thornhill v.
Alabamad9 that free discussion concerning labor disputes and conditions
in industry is essential to the effective and intelligent use of democracy
to shape the destiny of modern industrial society.100
99. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
100. Id. at 103, quoted in Brief for Respondent at 26.
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